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One of the most critical concerns that customers have voiced in the debate over real-time retail electricity
pricing is that they would be exposed to risk from fluctuations in their electricity cost.  The concern
seems to be that a customer could find itself consuming a large quantity of power on the day that prices
skyrocket and thus receive a monthly bill far larger than it had budgeted for.  I analyze the magnitude
of this risk, using demand data from 1142 large industrial customers, and then ask how much of this
risk can be eliminated through various straightforward financial instruments.  I find that very simple
hedging strategies can eliminate more than 80% of the bill volatility that would otherwise occur.  Far
from being complex, mystifying financial instruments that only a Wall Street analyst could love, these
are simple forward power purchase contracts, and are already offered to retail customers by a number
of fully-regulated utilities that operate real-time pricing programs.  I then show that a slightly more
sophisticated application of these forward power purchases can significantly enhance their effect on
reducing bill volatility.
Severin Borenstein





Over the last few years, a great deal has been written about time-varying retail pricing
of electricity. Many authors, myself included, have argued that real-time retail electricity
pricing (RTP) — retail prices that change very frequently, e.g., hourly, to reﬂect changes in
the market’s supply/demand balance — is a critical component of an eﬃcient restructured
electricity market. During the California electricity crisis in 2000-2001, RTP boosters
pointed out the value of RTP in reducing the ability of sellers to exercise market power.
While nearly all economists have supported RTP, large-scale adoption has been slowed
by at least three factors: cost of real-time metering and billing, large potential wealth
transfers among customers due to RTP, and the potential volatility of bills that customers
could face.
The metering and billing costs, while possibly a serious issue for smaller customers,
are minor compared to the potential beneﬁts of moving larger customers to RTP, as I
have shown in Borenstein (2005).2 In Borenstein (2006), I addressed the potential level of
transfers among larger customers due to RTP. I found signiﬁcant potential transfers and
that more than half of all customers could be worse oﬀ,e v e nc o m p a r e dw i t ht i m e - o f - u s e
pricing (a simple peak/oﬀ-peak pricing system). The transfers, however, can be greatly
mitigated through a two-part RTP program that gives incumbent customers the right to
buy their past load levels at regulated prices, but still charges/refunds at the real-time
energy price for their deviations from that level.
The third area of concern one frequently hears about RTP is the possible volatility
of costs to the end-use customer. This is often expressed as concern about the cost the
customer would face for electricity consumed during an hour in which prices hit an extreme
spike, such as $10,000/MWh. Two factors should reduce these concerns. First, customers
almost certainly care about volatility of their payments, which are typically on a monthly
or longer cycle, not the volatility of their hourly incurred liability. Second, in most RTP
implementations, there is some opportunity for the customer to buy ﬁxed-quantity, ﬁxed-
2 As technology improves over the next decade, the billing/metering cost arguments against RTP, even
at the household level, will likely disappear.
1price contracts in advance to cover some of their demand, and then pay/receive the real-
time price for deviations from the contracted quantity. In this paper, I address the question
of how much bill volatility is caused by RTP and the extent to which hedging in advance,
by purchasing forward contracts, might reduce that volatility.
The concern about volatility is somewhat puzzling to hear from large corporations
for whom electricity makes up a very small share of expenses. One might think that this
sort of risk could be easily absorbed by such customers. There are a number of possible
explanations, though none is entirely satisfying. One is that electricity may be only one
or two percent of total expenses, but could still be equal to the entire proﬁtm a r g i no ft h e
ﬁrm, so the proportional eﬀect on proﬁts could be much more signiﬁcant. Pressure from
equity and debt holders could cause the ﬁrm to be squeamish about even short-term proﬁt
ﬂuctuations.3 A second explanation is organizational. For whomever within the ﬁrm is
responsible for energy costs, this could be a large component of his or her responsibilities,
so a sudden dramatic increase in costs could have signiﬁcant career implications. A third
explanation may be simply a cost/beneﬁt analysis in which the customer sees tangible costs
from increased complexity and risk, but doesn’t understand the potential beneﬁts.4 In any
case, bill risk is nearly always raised by opponents of RTP among even large customers,
so it seems worth trying to estimate the size of that risk and consider how it might be
mitigated.5
3 This is part of the larger issue of why publicly traded ﬁrms worry about such idiosyncratic risk at
all if their shareholders are holding diversiﬁed portfolios. I don’t address this puzzle other than to
note that companies often take costly actions to insure against risks that are much smaller than the
ﬂuctuations in electricity bills that are conceivable. Brown and Toft (2002) provide a number of
citations to work on the reasons for corporate hedging.
4 I have heard all three of these explanations from representatives of customers who are opposed to,
or at least skeptical of, attempts to implement RTP.
5 As o m e w h a td i ﬀerent concern about analyzing electricity bill volatility of large corporations is that the
bill is determined in part by quantity, which is a choice variable of the ﬁrm. While that is correct,
for many customers, variation in quantity is determined largely by weather factors that alter the
amount of electricity necessary to maintain a given level of operations and comfort. Analogously, the
quantity of autos one purchases is a choice, yet most people still insure against the need to purchase
a new car because theirs has been stolen or destroyed in an accident. In the case of electricity, a
customer’s high weather-driven demand is also likely to be positively correlated with high electricity
prices. Furthermore, one concern voiced by many industrial customers is that they will fail to monitor
electricity prices hourly under RTP and will accidentally engage in high-consumption activities at a
2The issue of electricity bill volatility from RTP should also be considered in the context
of the volatility that customers already face due to electricity consumption variation under
historical pricing schemes. Even with a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ, a customer’s bill will vary due to
consumption variation. Under a time-of-use (TOU) tariﬀ — a simple peak/oﬀ-peak pricing
scheme — there will be more bill volatility for most customers due to higher prices in the
peak hours of the peak months. From these comparison points, I examine how much RTP
further increases bill volatility and how much that increase is mitigated by hedging.
The data I use for this analysis cover 1142 large industrial and commercial customers of
Paciﬁc Gas & Electric during 2000 through 2003.6 I combine these customer consumption
patterns with actual and simulated prices (based on data from the California Independent
System Operator), as described in the next section, to determine the customers’ bills under
ﬂat-rate, time-of-use, and real-time retail pricing programs, where retail rates are set in all
cases to cover the full wholesale cost of the power. From these monthly bills, I calculate
measures of monthly bill volatility for each customer.
Then I recalculate the customer bills and bill volatility under the assumption that they
have engaged in actuarially-neutral hedging contracts. By construction, the aggregate of
all customer bills over the entire sample period is the same in all of these scenarios, but
the monthly bill volatility of individual customers varies substantially. I show that while
changing from ﬂat-rate or TOU to RTP tariﬀs increases customer average bill volatility by
two to four times, simple hedging strategies eliminate the vast majority of that volatility.
I conclude that bill volatility should not be a signiﬁcant impediment to implementation of
a well-designed RTP program, but that hedging instruments are likely to be important to
building customer acceptance.
I then explore the levels of hedging in which a customer could engage. A simple
example illustrates the intuition that if price is positively correlated with a customer’s
time when the price has spiked.
6 These are all customers for whom PG&E submitted data for all 1461 days of this time period to the
California Energy Commission. The data are not publicly available, but were made available to me
under a nondisclosure agreement.
3consumption quantity, hedging more than expected quantity can reduce bill volatility by
more than hedging just the expected quantity. In fact, I show that such “over-hedging”
can reduce volatility to below the level faced by a customer subject to a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ.I
evaluate the empirical importance of this result by examining the eﬀect of various levels
of over-hedging on the bill volatility of the observed customers.
II. Consumption and Pricing Data
The analysis is based on a sample of 1142 large industrial and commercial customers of
Paciﬁc Gas & Electric company, which has a service territory that covers most of northern
California, during the period 2000-2003. All of the customers are in the sample for the
entire period. With these data, it is straightforward to construct a customer’s monthly
bills by combining the quantity data with any given price series for the same time period.
By constructing the customer bill this way, I am assuming zero price-elasticity of
the customer’s demand. Customer price elasticity would reduce the bill volatility induced
by RTP, because customers would respond to the higher-priced hours by consuming less.
Thus, assuming no such elasticity biases the calculation in the direction of ﬁnding a larger
impact of RTP on bill volatility.
I carried out the calculations using three diﬀerent wholesale price scenarios. The ﬁrst
is the actual wholesale spot prices that were observed in the control area of the California
Independent System Operator (CAISO) for northern California during the observed time
period. The other two are based on a long-run breakeven wholesale price simulation that
uses the CAISO’s actual load during the sample period. In all three scenarios, I assume that
the retail real-time prices customers face are equal to the wholesale prices plus $40/MWh
for transmission and distribution (T&D).7
The simulation model, which is described in detail in Borenstein (2005), establishes
7 This is a fairly typical assumption for T&D costs. In a more sophisticated implementation of RTP,
the T&D charge would also be subject to real-time variation that reﬂects congestion, but that is not
part of most current or planned RTP programs. Most utilities impose a charge related to distribution
capacity, called a demand charge, that is based on the customer’s peak usage during a billing period
regardless of when that peak usage occurs.
4a long-run perfectly competitive equilibrium in capacity and wholesale prices for a given
demand proﬁle (load duration curve), assumed demand elasticity, and costs of diﬀerent
types of production capacity. The data used for generating the wholesale price series for
this paper are not exactly the same as in Borenstein (2005). First, I use diﬀerent cost
data than those in the earlier paper, reﬂecting changes in capital and fuel costs since that
paper was written.8 Second, I use only demand data from the 4-year period 2000-2003. By
limiting the time period of simulation to just that period, I can impose that the resulting
prices are suﬃcient in aggregate to cover the amortized capital and variable costs of all
generators during the sample time period.
Absent large elasticity of aggregate electricity demand, much of the capital costs are
recovered in peak hours, though exactly how many hours and how peaky the prices are
depends on the exact elasticity of aggregate demand. I create two wholesale price series
with diﬀering elasticities of aggregate demand and diﬀerent resulting peakiness of prices.
By some measures the simulated wholesale prices are spikier than actually occurred
during most of 2000-2003 period. Due in part to price caps that were in place the high-
est actual prices are lower than the highest prices in either simulated scenario, but the
simulated prices exhibit fewer total hours with price about $200/MWh. The actual prices
average slightly higher than the simulated prices over the entire period, but this masks a
signiﬁcant change in mid-2001. Prior to June 2001, actual prices are considerably higher
than simulated, but after June 2001 the prices reverse. The earlier period was the Cali-
fornia electricity crisis. The latter was a period in which the state was widely viewed as
having signiﬁcant excess capacity, so prices remained low. These wholesale prices generally
were viewed as too low to support generation investment.9
8 The assumptions I use here for annual production cost are: Baseload (coal) Cost = $208247/MW +
$25/MWh; Mid-merit (CCGT) Cost = $93549/MW +$50/MWh; and Peaker (Combustion Turbine)
Cost = $72207/MW +$ 7 5 /MW h.T h e s e ﬁgures are taken from the PJM (2005), pages 82-83.
California does not have coal plants, but (a) there are coal plants in the western grid and (b) the
results are not aﬀected substantially by ﬁxing the level of baseload capacity in advance to reﬂect
nuclear and other must-take capacity.
9 The actual prices also include hours in which the real-time wholesale price was negative, which can
occur due to non-convexities in the production process and the fact that electricity generated cannot
5The simulation model assures that generators cover their variable plus amortized ﬁxed
costs during the sample period. The simulation is of an energy-only revenue model; there
are no separate capacity payments. Thus, ﬁxed cost recovery occurs during the highest-
demand hours when price exceeds the variable cost of even the most costly generation
units.
The two simulated scenarios diﬀer in the degree of demand elasticity that within-
market producers are assumed to face. Demand elasticity may come about from actual
end-user adjustments, but it can also come from import supply elasticity or the system
operator utilizing out-of-market resources to provide supply if the market prices rises high
enough. With extremely inelastic demand, the simulated market equilibrium includes a
very small number of hours in which prices are extremely high. These hours produce the
net revenues (scarcity rents) necessary for peaker generation units to cover their amortized
ﬁxed costs. With somewhat greater demand elasticity, the long-run equilibrium involves
the peaker generators collecting scarcity rents over more hours, but a lower level of scarcity
rents and a lower wholesale price in any one of those hours. In scenario I, I assume that the
demand elasticity faced by within-market producers is -0.025. In scenario II, I assume an
elasticity of -0.1.10 Summary statistics for the three wholesale price scenarios are presented
in table 1.11 I focus primarily on the analysis of results from scenario I simulated prices,
because this is the sort of scenario under which bill volatility from RTP would be of the
greatest concern.
With these prices and customer consumption quantities, I can then calculate each
customer’s monthly bill under RTP for each month it is in the sample. I then divide each
bill by the number of hours in the month in order to eliminate variation due to varying
always be disposed of costlessly.
10 In both simulations, I assume zero cross-hour price elasticity. Incorporating such cross-elasticity
would likely dampen real-time price volatility and the increase in bill volatility due to RTP. See
Borenstein (2005) for a discussion of this assumption.
11 The average price under scenario II is somewhat lower than under scenario I, because greater price
elasticity leads to lower capacity investment and higher capacity utilization in equilibrium, as dis-
cussed in Borenstein and Holland (2005).
6Table 1: Wholesale Prices in Alternative Scenarios
(all prices in $/MWh)
Time Period: 2000-2003, 35064 total hours
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
Very Volatile Less Volatile Actual No. Cal.
Simulated Prices Simulated Prices Spot Prices
Flat-Rate Tariﬀ 93.50 93.41 103.54
Fixed-Ratio TOU Tariﬀ — Maintaining Actual Price Ratios Among TOU Periods
Winter Oﬀ-Peak 79.45 79.38 87.98
Winter Peak 98.42 98.32 108.98
Summer Oﬀ-Peak 79.65 79.56 88.19
Summer Shoulder 92.96 92.87 102.94
Summer Peak 151.71 151.56 168.00
Cost-Based TOU Tariﬀ — Breakeven within Each TOU Period
Winter Oﬀ-Peak 68.80 68.80 101.16
Winter Peak 88.57 88.56 110.21
Summer Oﬀ-Peak 74.41 74.90 91.82
Summer Shoulder 97.07 104.38 107.58
Summer Peak 203.52 192.50 120.31
Real-time Pricing Tariﬀ
Minimum Price 65.00 65.00 -285.61
Median Price 90.00 89.13 76.59
Mean Price 88.77 88.77 100.95
Maximum Price 6321.66 1051.08 790.00
Number of Hours Price > $200 287 918 2725
Number of Hours Price is Above 383 1713 N/A
Highest Simulated Generation Marginal Cost
lengths of months. Henceforth, I refer to this average hourly bill during each month as the
customer’s “monthly bill.”12
In order to compare bill volatility under RTP with the alternatives, I also need to
create a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ and a time-of-use (TOU) tariﬀ to use in calculating the monthly
12 I drop nearly all hours in which the consumption is reported as exactly zero. For those in which
the adjacent hours on each side are present (a single missing hour) and are of typical level for the
customer, I interpolate the missing data. For many hours or days in a row of zero readings, I set
these observations to missing and calculation the “monthly bill” based only on the remaining hours.
These are either meter failures or complete power shutoﬀs, which could be due to on-site generation,
plant shut-down, or other causes. Including these zeros — which are not common in the sample —
makes very little quantitative diﬀerence to the results and does not change any of the qualitative
ﬁndings.
7bills for the observed customers. I do this by continuing to assume no demand elasticity
on the part of the observed customers and calculating the prices that would cover the costs
of the observed group of customers as if they were a distinct tariﬀ class.
For the ﬂat-rate tariﬀ, this is completely straightforward: I calculate the total rev-
enue that would be required to purchase the consumption of the observed customers in
t h ew h o l e s a l em a r k e to v e rt h e4 8 - m o n t hp e r i o d( u s i n ge a c ho ft h ew h o l e s a l ep r i c es e r i e s
discussed above) and then divided that revenue requirement by the aggregate consump-
tion of these customers over the 48-months. This yielded a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ that generated
suﬃcient revenues to purchase the power demanded by this group.
To create a TOU tariﬀ requires ﬁrst that one determine the diﬀerent rate periods.
I use nearly the same rate periods that PG&E used in its standard TOU tariﬀsd u r i n g
the observed time period. There are two periods during the “winter” months, in eﬀect
November through April: the peak rate is in eﬀect from 8am to 10pm on non-holiday
weekdays and the oﬀ-peak rate is in eﬀect at all other times. Summer rates, which cover
May through October, have three components: Peak period is noon-6pm on non-holiday
weekdays; Shoulder period is 8am-noon and 6pm-10pm on non-holiday weekdays, and
oﬀ-peak is all other times.13
Creation of a TOU tariﬀ is less straightforward than the ﬂat-rate because for a given
demand history there are an inﬁnite number of tariﬀs that would cover the total wholesale
power costs. A natural TOU tariﬀ would be for the rate within each of the ﬁve TOU
periods to be set to exactly cover the wholesale power procurement costs for that period,
i.e., no cross-subsidy across TOU periods. I use that as one basis of analysis, but the
TOU tariﬀ that results from this calculation exhibits much larger peak to oﬀ-peak rate
diﬀe r e n c e st h a nh a v eh i s t o r i c a l l yb e e nu t i l i z e db yP G & Eo rm o s to t h e rr e g u l a t e du t i l i t i e s .
After adding a $40/MWh charge for transmission and distribution, the ratio of the highest
13 In the four-year period I study, the number of hours each rate is in eﬀect are: winter oﬀ-peak, 10,512
hours; winter peak, 6,888 hours; summer oﬀ-peak, 10,440 hours; summer shoulder, 4128 hours;
summer peak, 3096 hours. The actual tariﬀ rate changes at 8:30am, but I have altered that because
the data are aggregated to the hour level. Similarly, the evening change occurs at 9:30pm, but I’ve
altered that to 10pm.
8TOU-period prices to the lowest would be 3.11 (using the scenario I real-time prices), while
the same ﬁgure for PG&E’s standard TOU rate is 1.91. Thus, this constructed TOU tariﬀ,
which I refer to as “cost-based TOU,” is economically appealing, but it would yield more
volatile bills than are likely to occur under actual TOU tariﬀs.
To address this, I also create a TOU tariﬀ that mimics the inter-period rate ratios
that existed under the standard TOU tariﬀ that PG&E oﬀered during the sample period.
To construct this tariﬀ, I calculated the ratios between the rates in the PG&E tariﬀ for the
ﬁve periods. I then adjusted all of the TOU rates together, maintaining these ratios, until
the resulting revenue covered the wholesale procurement costs of all power consumed by
the observed customers in aggregate. I refer to this as “ﬁxed-ratio TOU.” The resulting
ﬂat-rate and TOU tariﬀs, along with summary statistics of the RTP prices, are shown in
table 1.
By assuming throughout these rate calculations that all of the observed customers
exhibit zero price elasticity, I am implicitly assuming that moving these customers to
RTP does not further dampen wholesale price volatility. That price dampening eﬀect
must instead be recognized in evaluating the results of the exercise. It suggests that the
extremely volatile price scenario, scenario I, is less likely to occur once some customers are
on RTP.
Finally, comparing a customer’s bill volatility under diﬀerent pricing and hedging
regimes requires a measure of volatility. Because the customer’s concern is with risk, I
assume that predictable monthly variation is not at issue. Thus, I measure the “unexpected
deviation” component of the bill as the diﬀerence between the actual monthly bill and the
customer’s average bill for that month of the year. I use two measures of bill risk. The ﬁrst
I refer to as a “coeﬃcient of deviation”, which is the standard deviation of the customer’s
monthly unexpected bill deviation divided by the mean of the customer’s monthly bill.14
The second is an attempt to capture some customers’ concerns about extreme events,
14 This is nearly the coeﬃcient of variation of monthly bills, but not quite, because I am using the
deviation from the monthly seasonal-adjusted average bill.
9particularly bill spikes when the wholesale price increases drastically for a short period.
The second measure, which I refer to as the “coeﬃcient of maximum deviation” is the
customer’s maximum monthly unexpected bill deviation over the sample period divided
by its mean monthly bill.15
III. Bill Volatility with No Hedging
Table 2 presents the measures of bill volatility under the four tariﬀ regimes — ﬂat-rate
tariﬀ, cost-based TOU, ﬁxed-ratio TOU and RTP — for wholesale price scenario I, the most
volatile wholesale prices. Results for the two other wholesale price scenarios are presented
in the Appendix. As noted, one would expect to observe bill volatility even absent time-
varying prices due to consumption variation. This is reﬂected in the variation under a
ﬂat-rate tariﬀ. Indeed, the left-hand column indicates that under the ﬂat-rate tariﬀ the
average customer coeﬃcient of deviation is 0.155. The volatility is almost exactly the
same under either TOU pricing plan. While prices are more volatile under these plans,
the diﬀerences are captured in the predictable seasonal variation. This is not surprising in
that the prices are, by construction, identical across years for a given month. Because the
coeﬃcient of deviation is bounded below at zero, the distribution is highly skewed. The
median variation is about half the mean.
Bill volatility under RTP is, however, many times greater than under the other billing
arrangements. The mean volatility is more than double and the median is about four times
greater than under the alternatives.
The table presents the statistics on the full distribution of customer bill volatilities,
indicating that there are some customers with extremely high volatility. The fact that
this results even with a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ indicates that this bill-volatility is a result of large
15 Using a monthly seasonal adjustment with only four years of data suggests that a degrees of freedom
correction should be applied to all estimates of standard deviations, multiplying the sample statistic
by 4/3 to correct for the fact that the mean is calculated from the same data. Such a correction
would, of course, make no diﬀerence to the comparisons of volatility across pricing regimes. A similar
correction to the coeﬃcients of maximum deviation, however, is less clear since these are essentially
order statistics. To maintain some comparability between the two measures, I have not performed a
degrees of freedom correction on either.
10Table 2: Monthly Bill Volatility Under Alternative Billing Arrangements
(1142 Customers in Sample)
Coeﬃcient of Deviation in Monthly Bill
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
Flat-Rate 0.155 0.021 0.035 0.087 0.364 1.048
TOU - Fixed-ratio 0.156 0.021 0.037 0.086 0.365 1.057
TOU - Cost-based 0.159 0.022 0.039 0.088 0.371 1.083
RTP 0.419 0.187 0.264 0.367 0.602 1.272
Same-customer Comparison of Coeﬃcient of Deviation Under RTP and TOU-F
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
cd(RTP)
cd(TOU−F) 4.737 0.963 1.393 4.300 8.854 12.843
ﬂuctuations in the amount of electricity the customer uses. In fact, it appears that the
more volatile bills are due more to consumption volatility than price volatility. Moving up
the distribution from lower to higher bill volatility, it is clear that the ratio of volatility
under RTP to volatility under the conventional billing arrangements declines. In other
words, RTP exacerbates volatility for the bills that have low and medium volatility under
conventional billing, but has a relatively smaller eﬀect on volatility for the bills that are
most volatile under conventional billing.
The bottom panel of table 2 presents a by-customer analysis, showing the ratio of
bill volatility (as measured by the coeﬃcient of deviation) under RTP to volatility under
ﬁxed-ratio TOU (TOU-F). Consistent with the ﬁrst panel, the median customer sees its
bill volatility increase by more than four times. For more than ten percent of the sample,
bill volatility is at least eight times higher under RTP than under TOU-F.
While the coeﬃcient of deviation is a good measure of overall volatility, what many
customers seem to be concerned about is the outlier event, when they are hit with a huge
unanticipated bill spike. I attempt to capture than in table 3. Table 3 has the same
structure as table 2 except it presents the coeﬃcient of maximum deviation, the ratio of
a customer’s maximum bill deviation (from it’s seasonally-adjusted expectation) in the
sample to its average bill.
11Table 3: Coeﬃcient of Maximum Deviation Under Alternative Billing Arrangements
(1142 Customers in Sample)
Coeﬃcient of Maximum Deviation in Monthly Bill
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
Flat-Rate 0.318 0.042 0.072 0.182 0.658 2.359
TOU - Fixed-ratio 0.324 0.043 0.078 0.186 0.668 2.392
TOU - Cost-based 0.346 0.048 0.088 0.199 0.690 2.455
RTP 1.595 0.592 0.994 1.417 2.294 4.301
Same-customer Comparison of Coef. of Max. Deviation Under RTP and TOU-F
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
cx(RTP)
cx(TOU−F) 8.869 0.909 2.551 8.050 16.603 25.545
Table 3 conﬁrms that there is very little variation in unanticipated bill costs among
ﬂat rates, ﬁxed-ratio TOU and cost-based TOU, but RTP opens up much more possibility
for bill shock from a single month. In this sample of 1142 customers, the coeﬃcient of
maximum deviation averages between 30% and 35% under ﬂat rate or TOU. But the
coeﬃcient of maximum deviation under RTP is on average more than 150%, suggesting
that a typical customer would at some time during this sample receive a bill that is more
than two and a half times the expected level. For more than 10% of the sample the largest
unexpected bill diﬀerential would cause more than a tripling of the bill.
These analyses conﬁrm that real-time pricing without hedging could signiﬁcantly in-
crease customer bill volatility, at least if wholesale prices are quite volatile. As mentioned
earlier, this wholesale price volatility is probably greater than would obtain if a signiﬁcant
number of customers were on RTP. Still, the volatility increase could very well be suﬃcient
to cause substantial unease among some customers.
IV. Bill Volatility with Simple Hedging
Because of the potential for large unexpected bills under RTP, those utilities that
oﬀer or require an RTP plan for some customers usually also oﬀer a hedging option. The
hedging program allows the customer to purchase some of its power months in advance at
a less-volatile expected price. These programs are often used as inducements by setting
12the hedge price below the expected spot price, thereby combining a hedging program with
a transfer, which is often done to compensate the customer for the loss of a cross-subsidy
it was receiving under conventional billing.16 The analysis here does not encompass this
aspect of long-term power purchases; instead I set hedging prices to be actuarially fair.
I implement this not on a forward-looking probabilistic basis, but simply by setting the
price of the hedge equal to the unweighted average price during the hours that it covers in
the sample.
The hedging products that I examine here are modeled after structures in some of the
RTP hedge programs: diﬀerent products for peak and oﬀ-peak periods. For simplicity, I
model ﬁve hedge products that correspond to the ﬁve TOU periods over the year: a peak
and an oﬀ-peak product during the winter, and a peak, shoulder and oﬀ-peak product
during the summer. The product itself is deﬁned as purchase of one unit of power during
each of the hours in the sample that falls under the speciﬁed TOU period. The price of the
hedge, per MWh, is the unweighted average price of power during the hours covered. To
prevent cherry-picking of the hours with the highest expected prices within a TOU period,
a customer cannot buy diﬀerent quantities for diﬀerent hours within the same TOU period.
The prices for the hedges under price scenario I are: Summer-Peak (3,096 hours): $198.69,
Summer-Shoulder (4,128 hours): $96.70, Summer-Oﬀpeak (10,440 hours): $73.80, Winter-
Peak (6,888 hours): $88.36, Winter-Oﬀpeak (10,512 hours): $68.43. A comparison of these
prices with table 1 reveals that they are closer to cost-based TOU than to ﬁxed-ratio TOU,
but they are a bit more compressed than TOU-C. The reason is that the hedge prices are
unweighted averages of the wholesale prices while the TOU-C prices are weighted averages
in order to recover the full wholesale cost. These are still breakeven hedge prices, because
the hedge product is for the same quantity (one MWh) in all hours within the period.
These are obviously not very sophisticated hedge products. Hedges could potentially
be oﬀered and priced for even individual hours at some expected cost for that speciﬁc
hour. Without resorting to a forecasting model, I can’t mimic that process. Instead, I’m
16 See Borenstein (2006) for further discussion of the use of baseline quantity purchases to maintain
cross-subsidies.
13Table 4: Monthly Bill Volatility Under Alternative Billing Arrangements
(1142 Customers in Sample)
Coeﬃcient of Deviation in Monthly Bill
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
Flat-Rate 0.155 0.021 0.035 0.087 0.364 1.048
TOU - Fixed-ratio 0.156 0.021 0.037 0.086 0.365 1.057
TOU - Cost-based 0.159 0.022 0.039 0.088 0.371 1.083
RTP - Hedged 0.187 0.028 0.048 0.114 0.416 1.120
RTP 0.419 0.187 0.264 0.367 0.602 1.272
Same-customer Comparison of Coeﬃcient of Deviation Under RTP and TOU-F
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
cd(RTP−H)
cd(TOU−F) 1.308 0.900 0.982 1.230 1.732 2.420
cd(RTP)
cd(TOU−F) 4.737 0.963 1.393 4.300 8.854 12.843
using a broad hedging product based on the average prices over a long time span, the 4
year sample period. Because the wholesale price simulations generate diﬀerent prices only
due to demand variation, this approach approximates the distribution of prices a customer
might anticipate in the spot market going into a period, before information about abnormal
demand (or supply) is revealed.
To examine the magnitude of bill volatility under RTP with hedging, I also need to
determine the quantity of power purchased as part of the hedge. Here again I take a very
simple approach. The quantity that a customer purchases is assumed to be the customer’s
naive expected consumption in all hours to which the hedge product applies. For example,
for all hours that belong to the Summer-Peak TOU period, the customer purchases the
same hedge quantity and that quantity is the customer’s average consumption during
Summer-Peak TOU hours during the 4-year sample period. In an actual implementation,
the customer could almost certainly do better than this in predicting it’s consumption for,
for instance, a given summer period. The customer might know if it is ramping up its own
production or closing most of the operations for some period of time. Thus, this approach
is likely to underestimate the risk reduction from hedging.
A customer on RTP who hedges is assumed to have a power cost for hour t that is
14Table 5: Coeﬃcient of Maximum Deviation Under Alternative Billing Arrangements
(1142 Customers in Sample)
Coeﬃcient of Maximum Deviation in Monthly Bill
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
Flat-Rate 0.318 0.042 0.072 0.182 0.658 2.359
TOU - Fixed-ratio 0.324 0.043 0.078 0.186 0.668 2.392
TOU - Cost-based 0.349 0.049 0.089 0.202 0.694 2.483
RTP - Hedged 0.559 0.063 0.134 0.351 1.121 3.444
RTP 1.595 0.592 0.994 1.417 2.294 4.301
Same-customer Comparison of Coef. of Max. Deviation Under RTP and TOU-F
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
cx(RTP−H)
cx(TOU−F) 1.961 0.817 0.975 1.870 2.977 4.563
cx(RTP)
cx(TOU−F) 8.869 0.909 2.551 8.050 16.603 25.545
in TOU period h equal to Costt =ˆ qh · Ph +( qt − ˆ qh) · PRTP t,w h e r eˆ qh is the customer’s
average consumption during hours in that TOU period and Ph i st h eh e d g ep r i c eo faM W h
of power during that TOU period. From these hourly power costs, the customer’s monthly
bill (actually hourly average bill during the month, as explained earlier) is created for each
month and, just as in the previous section, the deviation from expected cost, conditional
on month of the year, is then calculated for each month.
The results are shown in table 4, which repeats table 2, but with a line for RTP-
Hedged. The eﬀect of hedging is quite strong: On average, this simple hedging plan
removes about 90% of the unanticipated bill volatility that would otherwise occur as a
result of changing from TOU-F to RTP. Table 5 repeats table 3, but with a line for RTP-
Hedged. Measuring now the coeﬃcient of maximum deviation, hedging again removes
most of the volatility due to RTP. On average RTP-H eliminates more than 80% of the
additional volatility that would otherwise occur under RTP. These eﬀects are also present
with pricing scenarios II and III, the results for which are shown in the appendix. Under
all three pricing scenarios, hedging eliminates the vast majority of volatility that would
otherwise result from implementation of RTP.
15V. Bill Volatility with Variable Hedging
In the previous section, I assumed a naive hedging strategy and demonstrated that
even such a simple approach could eliminate a great deal of the bill volatility that would
be associated with real-time pricing. More granular hedging products and precise demand
forecasts would further reduce the unanticipated volatility.17 If the customer’s goal is to
minimize its bill volatility, however, there is additional value in considering the correlation
between its own unanticipated high demand and high electricity prices.
There is an intuition, often expressed by large electricity customers, that a customer
is at increased risk of high bills if the its demand is positively correlated with price. This is
more than a theoretical concern for a customer that, for instance, runs its air conditioners
hardest on the hottest days of the year when prices are also likely to be highest.
A simple example demonstrates both that this intuition is correct and that this corre-
lation can make hedging especially valuable. Consider the examples in table 6. A customer
consumes a quantity of either 4 or 6 with equal probability. The market price is either 8 or
12, also with equal probability. In example A, the customer’s consumption is uncorrelated
with the system price. A bit of arithmetic reveals that the customer’s expected bill is
50 with a standard deviation of 14.28. An actuarially fair hedge contract in this market
would sell for 10, the expected price. Assume that the customer purchases a ˆ q =5u n i t
hedge, equal to its expected demand, for a price of p = 10 before either its demand or the
market price is revealed. If its demand turns out to be 6, it will buy one additional unit
on the spot market, and if its demand turns out to be 4, it will sell the extra unit on the
spot market. A bit more arithmetic shows that the expected bill is still 50, but now with
a standard deviation of 10.20. In fact, it is straightforward to show that a hedge of ˆ q =5
minimizes the standard deviation of the distribution of possible bills.
Now consider example B in which the prices and customer’s quantity each have the
same distribution as in A, but are now perfectly correlated with one another. Either the
17 Ih a v ee x p l o r e dt h ee ﬀect of using more granular hedging instruments by assuming that a customer
can buy a diﬀerent hedging product for each month-hour-weekday/weekend. More precise hedging
of this sort does further reduce the measures of volatility, but the eﬀect is relatively small.
16Table 6: Example of the Eﬀect of Over-Hedging
Market Price =
½
prob =0 .5P = 1 2
prob =0 .5P = 8
Customer Quantity =
½
prob =0 .5q = 4
prob =0 .5q = 6





prob =0 .25 q=4, P=8, Bill=32
prob =0 .25 q=4, P=12, Bill=48
prob =0 .25 q=6, P=8, Bill=48
prob =0 .25 q=6, P=12, Bill=72
Average Bill = 50 Standard Deviation = 14.28




prob =0 .25 q=4, P=8, Bill = 5 · 10 − 1 · 8=4 2
prob =0 .25 q=4, P=12, Bill = 5 · 10 − 1 · 12 = 38
prob =0 .25 q=6, P=8, Bill = 5 · 10 + 1 · 8=5 8
prob =0 .25 q=6, P=12, Bill = 5 · 10 + 1 · 12 = 62
Average Bill = 50 Standard Deviation = 10.20
Example B: Perfect Positive Correlation Between Market Price and Customer Quantity
NoHedging :
½
prob =0 .5 q=4, P=8, Bill=32
prob =0 .5 q=6, P=12, Bill=72
Average Bill = 52 Standard Deviation = 20
Hedging ˆ q = 5 at ˆ p =1 0:
½
prob =0 .5 q=4, P=8, Bill = 5 · 10 − 1 · 8=4 2
prob =0 .5 q=6, P=12, Bill = 5 · 10 + 1 · 12 = 62
Average Bill = 52 Standard Deviation = 10
Hedging ˆ q =1 0a tˆ p =1 0:
½
prob =0 .5 q=4, P=8, Bill = 10 · 10 − 6 · 8=5 2
prob =0 .5 q=6, P=12, Bill = 10 · 10 − 4 · 12 = 52
Average Bill = 52 Standard Deviation = 0
Example C: Perfect Negative Correlation Between Market Price and Customer Quantity
NoHedging :
½
prob =0 .5 q=4, P=12, Bill=48
prob =0 .5 q=6, P=8, Bill=48
Average Bill = 48 Standard Deviation = 0
17customer consumes 4 when the price is 8 or it uses 6 when the price is 12. The customer’s
expected bill is now 52 with a standard deviation of 20. If the customer buys a hedge
of ˆ q = 5, still at the actuarially fair price of 10, it reduces it’s standard deviation to 10,
less than the standard deviation resulting from the same hedge position when price and
quantity are uncorrelated. Now, however, consider if the customer took an even larger
hedge position, ˆ q = 10. This hedge would cost the customer 100. On low price/quantity
days, it would sell back 6 units at a price of 8. On high price days, it would sell back 4 units
at a price of 12. With probability 0.5, its cost of power would be 100−6·8 = 52 and with
probability 0.5, its cost of power would be 100 − 4 · 12 = 52. That is, over-hedging would
not only compensate for the positive price/quantity correlation, but would take advantage
of it to reduce bill volatility to zero.
The result is surprising (to most people, at least), but in retrospect it is just the
mirror image of a familiar result. Consider the case of perfect negative correlation, shown
in example C. In this case, most people are not surprised that complete under-hedging,
ˆ q = 0, purchasing all quantity on the spot market, results in zero bill volatility. Increasing
the hedge position above zero results in greater bill volatility. McKinnon (1967) develops
optimal hedging for a risk-averse farmer trying to stabilize income when price and his crop
yield are negatively correlated. He shows that “the more highly negatively correlated are
price and output the smaller will be the optimal forward sale.” More generally, he derives







where cv(q)a n dcv(p)a r et h ec o e ﬃcients of variation of quantity and price, respectively,
and ρ is the correlation between the price and the ﬁrm’s quantity. Equation [1] implies
that 100% hedging is optimal when price and quantity are uncorrelated, ρ =0 .W h e nρ is
positive, optimal hedging will be greater than 100% and the degree to which it increases
is an increasing function of the variability of the ﬁrm’s q and a decreasing function of the
variability of the market p. Likewise, if ρ < 0, the optimal hedge is less than 100% and
by a greater amount as the variability of q increases relative to the variability of p.T h e
result makes intuitive sense. For instance, if a ﬁrm’s quantity is highly predictable, cv(q)
18n e a rz e r o ,i ti sb e s to ﬀ to just hedge that expected quantity, regardless of the correlation
between price and quantity. McKinnon’s result has been applied broadly in an agricultural
economics literature on optimal hedging. I have not found an application to a buyer facing
positive price/quantity correlation, a case that McKinnon does not discuss, but that follows
immediately from his analysis.
To investigate how much empirical bite this insight has in the context of RTP, I
evaluated the bill volatility of the same 1142 PG&E customers under various levels of
under- and over-hedging. For this exploration, I simply ﬁxed the level of hedging for
ac u s t o m e ra td i ﬀerent percentages of the customer’s average consumption during the
hedge/TOU period. So, for example, for a single customer, I calculated its bill volatility if
it bought a hedge for each hedge/TOU period equal to 130% of its average consumption
(over the 4-year sample) during that hedge/TOU period. For each customer, I did this
calculation for every 10% interval from 0% to 200% hedging.18 I’ve carried out this analysis
using price scenario I.
Deﬁning “optimal hedging” for a customer as the level of hedging that minimizes its
bill coeﬃcient of deviation, the bars in ﬁgure 1 show the distribution of optimal hedge
levels for the 1142 customers. About 77% of all customers are best oﬀ with some amount
of over-hedging, i.e., a hedge level above 100% of their average consumption for each
hedge period. With every customer hedging optimally, the average coeﬃcient of deviation
drops to 0.147, down from 0.187 that resulted when all customers hedged 100% of their
average consumption. In fact, unexpected bill volatility is lower on average under RTP
with optimal hedging than it is under even a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ. The three lines in ﬁgure 1
show the average coeﬃcient of deviation for customers in each of the hedging bins under
three diﬀerent billing arrangements. The diﬀerence between the “100% hedged” line and
the “optimal hedge” line shows that the reduction in volatility for RTP customers can be
quite substantial for those customers with optimal hedge positions that are far from 100%.
Comparing the “optimal hedge” to the “TOU-F” line illustrates that optimally hedged
18 The 0% hedge results correspond to those shown in tables 4 and 5 for RTP and the 100% hedge
results correspond to those for RTP-H.
19RTP customers of all types have bill volatility at least as low as under the ﬁxed-ratio TOU
tariﬀ they currently face.
Figure 2 presents the same analysis for the coeﬃcient of maximum deviation. The
value of over-hedging appears to be even greater in reducing the bill shock from an extreme
outlier. About 84% of customers reduce their maximum unexpected bill deviation by over-
hedging. The bill volatility lines show that optimal hedging is a substantial improvement
over simple 100% hedging for most customers in reducing the highest unexpected bills.
This somewhat more sophisticated hedging strategy reduces the highest bills for most
customers to about the same level they now face under TOU-F.
While this analysis suggests that variable hedging may be important in reducing
customer bill risk, it likely overstates the potential beneﬁts, because it considers the eﬀect
of the optimal ex-post hedging strategy for each customer. In reality, customers will not
know ex ante exactly how much hedging will be optimal for their future demand pattern.
Their ex ante choices will necessarily be suboptimal on average. Still, variable hedging
with even imperfect information would almost certainly be an improvement over naive
hedging of 100% of a customer’s expected demand. Further research into methods for ex
ante determination of (constrained) optimal hedging levels is likely to be valuable.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that electricity bills are a small part of costs for most commercial
and industrial customers, there is a great deal of concern with the volatility of this cost
component. Such concerns have prompted some large customers to oppose real-time pricing
on the grounds that it could increase the risk they face from volatility in their monthly
bills.
I have shown that RTP without hedging could indeed substantially increase customer
bill volatility, potentially leading to bills that in some months are double or triple the level
that the customer would normally expect. That increased bill risk, however, can be almost
entirely eliminated through use of simple forward purchase contracts that hedge price risk
20for a ﬁxed quantity of power. I’ve demonstrated that the simple strategy of a customer
buying its expected demand quantity through a forward purchase contract eliminates more
than 80% of the additional bill volatility.
I then consider a somewhat more sophisticated approach to hedging, recognizing that
the optimal amount of hedging for a customer will depend on the correlation between its
demand and the real-time price. Because most customers exhibit a positive correlation, it
is optimal for most to over-hedge, i.e., purchase forward more than 100% of their expected
demand. Among customers in the sample, the optimal level of hedging varies considerably;
for some, less that 100% hedging would have minimized bill volatility. I show that optimal
hedging would have substantially reduced bill volatility compared to 100% hedging for
many customers. On average, optimal hedging even reduced bill volatility below the level
customers face on conventional TOU tariﬀs. Ex post optimal hedging is probably not
achievable, but this suggests that it would be worthwhile to explore further approaches to
determining ex ante a customer’s best hedging strategy based on limited information.
I have not considered the implications of variable hedging for the forward market.
While it seems likely that sellers would also be interested in stabilizing their revenues —
so would be interested in selling signiﬁcant quantities forward — it is not clear that the
demand for over-hedging that this analysis suggests would be met by an equally willing
supply of over-hedging without a signiﬁcant premium. In fact, to the extent that producers
are subject to random outages and that they occur more frequently when prices are high,
McKinnon’s analysis suggests that they might want to hedge less than 100% of their
expected output. Bessembinder & Lemon (2002) suggest that if only risk-averse industry
participants trade in a forward market for electricity, an equilibrium risk premium will
result that will be negative during low-demand/low-volatility times and positive during
high-demand/high-volatility times. This would, of course, leave speculative opportunities
that have positive net present value. Borenstein, Bushnell, Knittel, and Wolfram (2004)
ﬁnd signiﬁcant forward premia/discounts in the California electricity market, but argue
that they could not plausibly be attributable to risk aversion. Whether entry from other
ﬁnancial participants, which has occurred to some extent in electricity, would be suﬃcient
21to drive forward prices to expected spot price levels is an open question.
I also have not yet analyzed the role that option contracts could have in addressing
bill volatility. It might at ﬁrst appear that a call option contract would eliminate all bill
volatility for the buyer that is due to price ﬂuctuations, because it gives the option to
buy (or not) at a ﬁxed price. This intuition, however, is not accurate. A ﬁnancial option
yields positive returns whenever the market price is above the strike price, regardless of the
demand of the customer holding the option at that particular time. So, proﬁt-maximizing
exercise of options would not eliminate bill volatility (net of proﬁts from holding the
option). It is not clear to me at this point the degree to which the contingent payoﬀ
s t r u c t u r eo fo p t i o nc o n t r a c t sw o u l dh e l pt om i t i g a t eb i l lv o l a t i l i t y . 19
19 Brown & Toft (2002) and Oum, Oren & Deng (2005) consider optimal hedging with options when
price and quantity are stochastic.
22Appendix: Bill Volatility Using Alternative Wholesale Price Scenarios
Price Scenario II: Less Volatile Simulated Prices
Coeﬃcient of Deviation in Monthly Bill
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
Flat-Rate 0.155 0.021 0.035 0.087 0.364 1.048
TOU - Fixed-ratio 0.156 0.021 0.037 0.086 0.365 1.057
TOU - Cost-based 0.159 0.022 0.039 0.088 0.365 1.083
RTP - Hedged 0.171 0.025 0.044 0.097 0.385 1.083
RTP 0.284 0.132 0.163 0.228 0.449 1.176
Coeﬃcient of Maximum Deviation in Monthly Bill
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
Flat-Rate 0.318 0.042 0.072 0.182 0.658 2.359
TOU - Fixed-ratio 0.324 0.043 0.078 0.186 0.668 2.392
TOU - Cost-based 0.346 0.048 0.088 0.199 0.691 2.456
RTP - Hedged 0.447 0.056 0.110 0.266 0.908 2.897
RTP 0.920 0.372 0.536 0.769 1.368 3.366
Price Scenario III: Actual Northern California Real-Time Wholesale Prices
Coeﬃcient of Deviation in Monthly Bill
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
Flat-Rate 0.155 0.021 0.035 0.087 0.364 1.048
TOU - Fixed-ratio 0.156 0.021 0.037 0.086 0.365 1.057
TOU - Cost-based 0.155 0.021 0.036 0.086 0.363 1.045
RTP - Hedged 0.186 0.025 0.044 0.107 0.427 1.093
RTP 0.637 0.367 0.519 0.586 0.811 1.425
Coeﬃcient of Maximum Deviation in Monthly Bill
PERCENTILES
Tariff Mean 1st 10th 50th 90th 99th
Flat-Rate 0.318 0.042 0.072 0.182 0.658 2.359
TOU - Fixed-ratio 0.324 0.043 0.078 0.186 0.668 2.392
TOU - Cost-based 0.317 0.043 0.073 0.181 0.672 2.350
RTP - Hedged 0.508 0.051 0.100 0.280 1.127 3.894
RTP 1.783 0.809 1.380 1.585 2.261 5.036
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% of Customers TOU-F Optimal Hedge 100% Hedge Unhedged